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We explore an economy with two regions and independent local administrations. 
Local governments collect taxes to finance public education, but once educated agents 
can choose to migrate to the other region. The Nash equilibrium of the long-run game 
between the two governments is compared to a golden rule-type social optimum. 
Preliminary results show that the Nash equilibrium will result in over- or under-
investment depending on the extent to which public education is subject to congestion. 
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European integration is rendering labor increasingly mobile within the Union. Simulta-
neously, the Bologna process aiming at ﬁxing standards in European higher education
is likely to increase competition among educational institutions. These are fundamental
changes that raise important issues like: who has to ﬁnance higher education, how can
national governments behavior aﬀect convergence among member states, or whether
coordination from the European Commission could play a role.
This paper is an attempt to build a framework in which local governments have large
degrees of freedom ﬁxing their ﬁscal policies and the levels of education, but cannot
prevent agents from moving from one region to another. We wish to examine whether
strategic behavior leads local administrations to over- or under-invest in education.
Two seminal papers by Buchanan and others originated a large literature on the
decentralized provision of public goods. This is our departure point, adapted to the
speciﬁc characteristics of public education. As put forward by Starrett (1980), the dis-
cussion is about a situation in which increasing taxes allows to increase expenditures on
the public good, but attracts immigrants with the consequent congestion costs. From
the individual point of view, the migration decision involves a comparison of alternative
combinations of private and public good. Local governments are aﬀected by the deci-
sions of the other regions, and they behave strategically when choosing their tax schemes
and the provision of the public good. This literature examines whether decentralized
equilibria (usually the Nash equilibrium of the game between local governments) attains
this optimum, and if not, whether there is a role for a federal government.
There are three reasons why that framework has to be adapted to address issues
related to education. First, agents get formal education and pay taxes in diﬀerent
periods of their life and, eventually, in diﬀerent regions. Second, the agent that pays
the taxes is not the same agent that enjoys the expenditure of these public revenues.
Third, once received, education is embodied in the individual and does not depend on
the region of residence.
The ﬁrst reason makes the problem faced by the local government essentially dif-
ferent from the case of the public good. In this paper we interpret education in a very
broad sense, from primary school to professional or higher education. It is assumed
that agents get educated in the region in which they are born, the region chosen by the
parents. Migration decisions are taken when the agent is mature, when he is alreadyeducated. Hence, the problem of a local government is not anymore one of choosing
the right combination of a private good and a public good. Those who beneﬁtf r o m
education are not making any decisions yet, and if they will migrate or not, it will de-
pend on taxes in a future period. In our context, increasing taxes may improve public
education but causes a loss of revenues because mature agents decide to emigrate to
other regions. The key feature of education will then be the extent to which it is subject
or not to congestion. If expenditures are shared by all students, emigration may have
good eﬀect in per capita terms if the loss of population cause a less than proportional
loss of revenues. In that sense, our analysis parallels that of Boadway and Flatters
(1982) in the context of public goods. Following these authors, in the model presented
below, some congestion parameter will determine whether investment in education is
something like a private good or rather some sort of public good.2 We will see that this
congestion parameter will largely determine whether local governments tend to under-
or over-invest in education with respect to some resonable social optimum. Incidentally,
from the individual point of view, the migration decision is simpler in our case. There
is no combination of private and public good to evaluate: when mature, agents just
migrate to the lower tax region.
The second reason explains why in the case of education it is not that clear what
is a social optimum. In the case of public goods, it is usually the case that only one
Pareto-eﬃcient allocation is compatible with a demographic equilibrium: when agents
do not have an incentive to change residence. Hence, the discussion is often about what
tax/service scheme makes of the social optimum a Nash equilibrium, or whether some
(federal) coordination device is needed for the decentralized equilibrium to be optimal,
at least in some constraint sense.3 In the case of education, there is no straightforward
2As a matter of fact, education is not a public good but an investment, but this is not what
makes the case of education essentially diﬀerent from the case of the public good. We shall
emphasize again that the diﬀerence with the public good case is that education is received in a
period of life diﬀerent from that in which the agent makes migration and private consumption
decisions.
3There is for example a discussion about the need for coordination when some instruments
are available to the local governments. For instance, Myers (1990) and Mansoorian and Myers
(1993) have put in question the need for any federal coordination if regions can make transfers
to “purchase” the right size of their population. However, this remains an open debate, as
some authors, like Hercowitz and Pines (1992) question these results.concept of social optimum because the agent that pays taxes is diﬀerent from that
receiving revenues through public education. Below we construct a model of successive
generations in which virtually any ﬁscal policy induces a Pareto eﬃcient allocation
provided that revenues are fully invested in education and not wasted.
There is a third characteristic of public education that makes it essentially diﬀerent
from the public good case: human capital is embodied in the individual. Migration
involves a redistribution of human capital among regions. Observe that this implies
that agents will be in general heterogeneous within regions, even at a demographic
equilibrium, because their stock of human capital may diﬀer depending on the region
of origin. This is an additional diﬃculty to set a concept of social optimum.4
In this paper we wish to set up a model economy that accounts for these three basic
characteristics of public education. In its present state, we introduce an economy of
overlapping generations with two regions. When mature, each generation pays taxes to
ﬁnance public education for the young generation. Once educated, agents decide at the
beginning of their mature age whether or not to migrate. If net labor earnings of the
other region exceed net labor earnings at home, the agent will decide to move to the
other region. A key feature of the model is that migration changes both population and
the stock of human capital as migrants carry with themselves their individual skills. If
each region sets the ﬁscal policy independently, increasing taxes has two eﬀects:
• Increase revenues from each resident to fund public education.
• Expel agents who decide to migrate to avoid higher taxes, reducing the tax base
and therefore reducing aggregate revenues.
If the government cares for future generations, the ﬁrst eﬀect is positive and the
second is negative. Whether a government will tend to increase taxes or not will depend
on the extent to which education is subject to congestion. Below we will assume that
an individual stock of human capital h is attained by investing in education an amount
E = Nθh of the consumption good. When θ =1 , education behaves like a private
good. Loosing residents implies reducing the tax base but also to number of pupils to
share the budget because h = E/N. Hence, the government may have the incentive to
4At this stage, however, we concentrate on long run strategic interaction, and in steady
s t a t e st h e r ew i l lb en om i g r a t i o nb yd e ﬁnition. The problem will arise some time when we
consider truly dynamic games.increase taxes to increase per capital expenditures in education in the loss of residents
is compensated by a more than proportional increase in education expenditures per
pupil. When θ =0 , education is more like a public good h = E.R e d u c i n gt h et a xb a s e
is not compensated by a reduction in the number of pupils.
In the sections below we will consider the long run game between the two govern-
ments. We will compare the Nash equilibrium with some golden rule tax rate. We will
see that at the Nash equilibrium governments will tend to under-invest in education (too
low taxes) when education is more like a public good. Conversely, the non-cooperative
equilibrium will tend to over-invest in education (too high taxes) when education is
more like a private good.
2 Aw o r l dw i t ht w or e g i o n s
In this section we describe a successive generations’ economy composed of two regions
with independent governments. Individuals are productive to the extent to which the
government invests in their education. There is no human capital spillovers and there-
fore there is no growth: individual human capital will be a stationary variable in the
long run.
2.1 Population and human capital dynamics
When describing the local region, it will be understood that each variable has its coun-
terpart for the foreign region. A tilde will denote that any particular variable refers to
the foreign region.
World population is constant and normalized to W>0.A tt h eb e g i n n i n go fp e r i o d
t the local region has population Nt−1. A fraction ρt of the local population remains in
their region of origin and a fraction 1 − ρt migrates. Hence, population in period t is
given by
Nt = ρtNt−1 +( 1− ˜ ρt) ˜ Nt−1 (1)
where ρtNt−1 is the number of agents who did not leave the region and (1 − ˜ ρt) ˜ Nt−1 is
the number of newcomers. Each individual born in period t − 1 in the local region has
received education et−1 from the government bears a stock of human capital ht = et−1.
This very simple linear technology simpliﬁes the analysis with no loss of generality. Theproduction function of the physical good described below will be strictly concave. If
the production function of human capital would be concave, it would just add some
extra degree of concavity to the production possibilities frontier of the region.
Aggregate stock of human capital after migration has taken place is
Ht = ρtNt−1ht +( 1− ˜ ρt) ˜ Nt−1˜ ht. (2)
Individuals are assumed to organize spontaneously to engage in productive activities.
We abstract from distribution issues and assume that in this implicit arrangement
each agent owns an equal share of the property of the ﬁrm. Available technology is
represented by an aggregate production Yt = Hα
t for some α ∈ (0,1). Decreasing
returns to scale can be interpreted as an abstraction of technological progress. It is
an appealing assumption because it makes the wage endogenous: increasing the labor
force because of migrations will bid down wages.
Agents perceive labor earnings after taxes (1 − τt)wtht where wt = αH
α−1
t but
proﬁts are assumed to be fully taxed. The full tax on proﬁts can be seen as a way of
abstracting from property issues and will simplify the no-mobility condition below. We
do not think, however, that is an essential assumption, and no intuition in the sections
to come seem to rely on this assumption. Further, when we think of actual migrations,
it is very likely that the decisions are taken on the basis of labor income comparisons,
and proﬁts (like dividends to shares or returns to bank deposits) do not seem to play
any role.
2.2 Public education
We abstract from private education because most European education, including higher
education, is either public, as in France and Spain, or strongly subsidized, as in Belgium.
Each agent in the economy, regardless of his origin, gives birth to a single new agent.
An agent born in period t in the local region receives public education ht+1 from the
government. The government’s budget constraint is
N
θ
t ht+1 =( 1− α)H
α
t + τtwtHt
where the ﬁrst term are proﬁts and the second the government’s share of labor earnings.
Public education is assumed to have some degree of congestion controlled by pa-
rameter θ.W h e nθ =1education is something like a private good while θ =0renderseducation some sort of public good. As discussed in the introduction, we will prove
that the extent to which education is subject or not to congestion costs will determine
the behavior of local governments if these care about per capita variables.
2.3 No-mobility conditions
Free mobility is the only reasonable assumption if we are to consider migrations within
federal states or with member states of the European Union. Since proﬁts are fully
taxed, agents will migrate until net labor earnings are equalized across regions.
For any given stock of capital ht, an agent will consume ct =( 1− τt)wtht at home
and dt =( 1− ˜ τt)˜ wtht if he decides to migrate. Hence, an agent from the local region
will stay at home if (1 − τt)wt ≥ (1 − ˜ τt)˜ wt and will migrate otherwise. Since this is
true for the foreign region too, at a demographic equilibrium
(1 − τt)wt =( 1− ˜ τt)˜ wt.
It should be clear by now that beneﬁts are fully taxed to simplify the no-mobility
conditions: in this economy there cannot be migration in both senses. In other words,
ρt < 1 implies ˜ ρt =0and viceversa.
Observe too that agents have no cost associated to migration. The decision is taken
solely on the basis of net labor earnings comparisons. We will argue later in this paper
that this is a better representation of actual migration ﬂows. A period in this model
economy is intended to represent approximately forty years in real life. Even if it is
costly to move in the short run, this cost is “diluted” in forty years of a better life
because of higher income. In any case, the introduction of mobility costs is very likely
to give local governments some room to set diﬀerent tax rates but very unlikely to
constitute any fundamental characteristic of this economy.
2.4 Equilibrium for exogenous taxes
To examine the behavior of this economy let us assume for the moment that taxes are
given. Both governments have ﬁxed a stream of taxes τt and ˜ τt for t ≥ 0.
At the beginning of period t variables given are Nt−1 and ht.F r o m e q u a t i o n s ( 1 )
and (2) it is immediate to derive the aggregate resources constraints for population andhuman capital
Nt + ˜ Nt = W
Ht + ˜ Ht = Nt−1ht + ˜ Nt−1˜ ht. (3)
The no-mobility condition can be written in terms of aggregateh u m a nc a p i t a la s
(1 − τt)H
α−1
t =( 1− ˜ τt) ˜ H
α−1
t . (4)
Using wt = αH
α−1
t , the government’s budget constraint is
N
θ
t ht+1 =( 1− α(1 − τt))H
α
t .
From this equation it is clear that the only constraint faced by governments is that
τt ≤ 1 and 1 − α(1 − τt) ≥ 0. This implies that feasible choices of τt have to verify
α − 1
α
≤ τt ≤ 1. (5)
Indeed, since beneﬁts are fully taxed, it remains open the possibility that the labor tax
is in fact a subsidy τt < 0.
We have ﬁve equations (add the foreign government budget constraint) and six
unknowns: for the two regions, population Nt, human capital Ht, and education ht+1.
The last equation determines the sense of migration. Given any initial condition,
from equations (4) and (3) we can determine aggregate stocks Ht and ˜ Ht. Then check
whether people should be migrating from the foreign region Ht >N t−1ht or the reverse.




Ht − Nt−1ht =(˜ Nt−1 − ˜ Nt)˜ ht if Ht ≥ Nt−1ht
˜ Ht − ˜ Nt−1˜ ht =( Nt−1 − Nt)ht otherwise
.
Observe that since agents in diﬀerent regions can bear diﬀerent levels of education,
changing taxes changes all variables in a continuous fashion except population: changes
will not be diﬀerentiable at the point where the sense of migration is reversed.
3L o n g r u n o p t i m a l ﬁscal policies
In this context there is no natural social welfare criterium. For the sake of comparisons,
we resort to a long run optimality criterion that is familiar to growth theorists: thegolden rule. Observe that education in this context is the only form of savings, and
education is in turn determined by the tax rate. Hence, the tax rate here plays the
same role as the savings rate in the Solow model, and a reasonable reference point will
be the tax rate that maximizes per capita consumption in the long run.
3.1 The golden rule in the closed economy
Unless one ﬁnds interesting to examine erratic or cyclic ﬁscal policies, it is reasonable
to think that a ﬁscal policy in a closed economy consists of a sequence of tax rates
τt,τt+1,...that become constant at least from some give period on τt = τ.
In order to examine the long run equilibrium of the economy we shall simply assume
that a ﬁscal policy is a given ﬁxed tax rate τ verifying the constraint (5) above. If there
is no migration, the equilibrium dynamics are described by the equations





t ht+1 =( 1 − α(1 − τt))H
α
t .
Normalize population to one and in the long run
c =( 1 − τ)αh
α
h
1−α =1 − α(1 − τ).
The golden rule tax rate maximizes per capita consumption in the long run. The
second equation can be used to obtain an expression for dh/dτ.D i ﬀerentiating the ﬁrst
equation and equalizing to zero yields the golden rule tax rate τ∗ =2− 1/α.
The modiﬁed golden rule stems from the maximization of a discounted sum of








t (1 − τt)) s.t. ht+1 =( 1− α(1 − τt))h
α
t .
where U is any diﬀerentiable one-period utility function with U  > 0 and U   < 0.N o t e
that consumption can be expressed in terms of education as hα








t − ht+1).The ﬁrst order condition in the steady state is −1+βαhα−1 =0so that h1−α = βα.
Since in any case h1−α =1− α(1 − τ) we can just solve βα =1− α(1 − τ) for the
tax rate to obtain τ∗∗ =1+β − 1/α.O fc o u r s e ,τ∗∗ = τ∗ when β =1 ,a n dτ∗∗ < τ∗
whenever β < 1. If the government cares relatively more for the ﬁrst generations, its
optimal ﬁscal policy will tend to invest less in education.
3.2 The behavior of the open economy in the long run
Consider now the open economy. Before we go on to consider any strategic behavior,
let us examine the reaction of the economy to changes in the local tax rate when the
foreign region maintains constant the ﬁscal policy.
The main diﬀerence with respect to the closed economy is that population is now
endogenous: changes in the local tax rate, given the foreign tax rate, will eventually
cause migrations and therefore a redistribution of population between the two regions.
The impact on education, and therefore on consumption, will depend to a large extent
on the relationship between the labor share of income α and the degree of congestion
in the education sector θ.
Figure 1 displays the typical reaction of all variables in the long run to changes
in the local ﬁscal policy τ when the foreign ˜ τ remains ﬁxed. Parameters are ﬁxed as
α =0 .50 and θ =0 .20 so that education is more like a public good. The foreign tax rate
is ﬁxed to ˜ τ =0 .20. Local variables are represented by solid lines and foreign variables
by dashed lines. World population is normalized to Nt + ˜ Nt =2 0 .
Population in the local region Nt decreases until τt =1in which case all agents in
the local region just migrate to the foreign region for obvious reasons: net income in
the local region is zero. What is interesting is what happens to human capital. The
initial increase in τ makes revenues per head increase faster than population decreases,
and hence the initial increase in human capital stock. Of course, to the extent that
individual consumption is a function the individual stock of human capital, a similar
story applies to the reaction of consumption to changes in τ.
W h e ne d u c a t i o ni sm o r el i k eap r i v a t eg o o d ,t h eg o v e r n m e n tm a yw a n tt oi n c r e a s e
taxes with no bound. In that case the problem of choosing some τ to maximize per
capita consumption may not be well deﬁned.Figure 1: Reaction of the steady state to changes in the local tax
4 The long run Nash equilibrium
In the previous section we saw that for θ low enough the golden rule objective function
is well deﬁned. In terms of strategic behavior, this means that the reaction function is
well deﬁned. In this section we show that if c is a concave function of τ, the reaction
function is well deﬁned and a Nash equilibrium exists.
4.1 The reaction function
We assume that the government cares of per capita consumption of the local residents.
In the short run it may be possible that we have agents of diﬀerent origin and therefore
diﬀerent levels of consumption. In the long run, however, a demographic steady state
will require no migration and there will be just one type of agent in the region. From
section 2 we know that each agent consumes c =( 1− τ)wh w h i c hc a nb ew r i t t e na s
c =( 1− τ)αHα−1h. Since there is no migration in the steady state, we have H = Nhso that




Fix the ﬁscal policy of the other region (α − 1)/α ≤ ˜ τ ≤ 1 and the non cooperative
objective of the government is to maximize c with respect to τ. Using again H = Nh,
the government budget constrain relates H and N so that
c =( 1− τ)αN
(1−θ)α
1−α −1(1 − α(1 − τ))
α
1−α.
To obtain an expression for dc/dτ we need to know the reaction of N to changes in τ.
Observe that the no-mobility condition relates the ratio of aggregate stocks of human










Using the government budget constraint and this ratio, and after some cumbersome





1 − α(1 − ˜ τ)
1 − α(1 − τ)
 
1 − τ
1 − ˜ τ
   1
1−θ
.
From this expression, and again after some tedious calculations, we can obtain an
expression for dN/dτ. From the expression for consumption above we can obtain dc/dτ
as a function of dN/dτ. In a symmetric Nash equilibrium τ =˜ τ and all these expressions












Observe that the golden rule tax rate is 2−1/α. The two last terms can be seen as the
contribution of strategic behavior to the ﬁscal policy.
4.2 Interpretation
Increasing θ increases the contribution of strategic behavior to the equilibrium tax
rate. The more education is like a private good, the more the government may have
the incentive to act in an elitist way: increasing taxes may reduce the tax base but
increase the per capital expenditures in education. It can be proven that if α and θa r es u c ht h a tt h es t r a t e g i cc o m p o n e n to fτN is positive, then dc/dN < 0,t h a ti s ,t h e
government has an incentive to reduce population by increasing taxes.
As we suspected in the previous section, the Nash equilibrium may not be well
deﬁned. As θ approaches to one, the last term of τN diverges violating the feasibility
condition that τ < 1.
5 Concluding remarks
The original motivation of this paper was to examine endogenous growth issues in a
world with human capital accumulation and strategic behavior of local governments.
This paper can be seen as a preliminary exploration of a framework suitable to be
adapted to examine issues related to growth in regions. Further research would extend
the analysis to growing regions in order to analyze, for instance, whether and how
regions may or may not converge due to the strategic behavior of governments.
The ﬁrst extension we wish to consider is the introduction of transfer schemes in
order to implement the social optimum, in the case above, the golden rule. Once the
long run game is fully understood, we wish to examine the dynamic game between
the two governments. We aim to analyze the impact of period-by-period competition
and whether subgame perfect equilibria can help us better understanding this type of
economies. Of course, there is a number of qualiﬁc a t i o n st ob em a d et ot h i st y p eo f
analysis. For instance, one may wonder if there are such benevolent governments that
care of residents consumption. One plausible objective is the size of the administration.
From a political economics point of view, politicians may be more interested in the
size of the budget Nθ
t ht+1 than in the eﬀective production of human capital ht+1.T h i s
paper is a ﬁrst step towards constructing a framework to address all these questions.
References
[1] Starrett, D.A. (1980) “On the method of taxation and the provision of local public
goods,” American Economic Review, 70(3), 380-392.
[2] Boadway, R. and Flatters, F. (1982) “Eﬃc i e n c ya n de q u a l i z a t i o np a y m e n t si naf e d -
eral system of government: A synthesis and extension of recent results,” Canadian
Journal of Economics, 15, 613-633.[3] Myers, G.M. (1990) Optimality, free mobility, and the regional authority in a fed-
eration,” Journal of Public Economics, 43, 107-121.
[4] Mansoorian, A. and Myers, G.M. (1993) “Attachment to home and eﬃcient purchase
of population in a ﬁscal externality economy,” Journal of Public Economics, 52, 117-
132.
[5] Hercowitz, Z. and Pines, D. (1992) “Migration with ﬁscal externalities,” Journal of
Public Economics, 46, 163-180.